2-1. Unfair and unfree process: According to the Constitution (or more accurately the interpretation of the Constitution according to the Council of Guardians) women and Sunni muslims cannot become President. Next to this, the most important problem with the elections is the approbatory supervision of the Council of Guardians. All citizens are divided into two groups in the first step: those who believe in the constitution and those who don't. The people who do not believe in the constitution are deprived of their civil rights and naturally do not have the right to run or vie for many positions and occupations. That is, Iran does not belong to all Iranians and only the insiders [from the ideological point of view] are counted as citizens.
In the next step the believers in the constitution are dealt with. It is not enough to be committed in practice to the constitution and Velayat-i Faqih(1) [ie. the individual who happens to be the leader at that time], but one should also believe in the theory of Velayat-i Faqih and its embodiment. That is, those who accept Islam and the constitution but do not believe in the theory of Velayat-i Faqih or its embodiment will be disqualified.
In the next step, the Council of Guardians disqualifies numerous people by illegal excuses; because they are not practically committed to Islam, the Constitution, Velayat-i Faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini, etc. It is in this step that the Council of Guardians eliminates serious rivals of the authoritarian faction.
Discrimination in using the media is the next problem. Not only has the rival candidate no right to use many of the media outlets, but also major elements of the system come in favour of the candidate supported by the Leader, and take away the possibility of a fair competition from the rival candidate.
Fraud is another cause that makes the elections process unfair. Organized fraud has become commonplace in Iranian elections in three ways:
First, elections are held in places where conservatives could cast forged ballots. It is said that usually a few million fraudulent ballots are cast at this stage. Second, at the time of counting the votes, a widespread cheating in favour of the conservative candidate takes place. Rival candidates' votes are counted for the conservative [candidates]. Third, orders are given from "above" to add, for the expediency of the system, a certain percentage to the total votes in order to increase the turnout and provide the system with legitimacy. It may be said that these are problems of execution. Yes, elections are executive issues. If there is fraud in executing (holding) elections, the process and the outcome of the elections are unfair and undemocratic.
Another aspect of the unfair process is that if, despite using all the methods described above , the conservatives still fail to win the elections, the Council of Guardians will declare the elections void so that their desired candidate could come through, using extraordinary methods. On the other hand, according to the Council of Guardians' interpretation of the constitution, the Leader can still decide not to authorize the President's decree.
The reformists have proposed two solutions to this problem: First, a change in the body of the Council of Guardians and the appointment of new members who would act fairly. Second, holding free elections supervised by international organizations (such as the United Nations).
If we could overlook, for a moment, the fact that the Islamic Republic will never accept these solutions, we cannot forget that the electoral law requires the Council of Guardians to legally disqualify many people. It must be noted, of course, that any statistics on the level of participation in elections is not acceptable without the supervision of independent international organizations.
2-2. A product with no authority: assuming that the problem of the undemocratic process could be resolved, there remians an even more important problem that would still necessitate the boycott of the elections. Here's the problem: the product of the democratic process lacks the necessary authority to effect structural changes and fundamental reforms. Moreover, the main elements of the system will resist a truly elected President. Isn't the President supposed to work within this constitution with the same Leader, legislature, Council of Guardians, Expediency Council, city councils and municipality, state TV and Radio, Basij, Revolutionary Guards and Police, etc.? Isn't he supposed to execute the fourth five-year plan that is ratified by the seventh Majlis? Isn't he supposed to work within the perspective twenty-year plan of the Leader? Isn't he supposed to work within the framework of the general policies drawn out by the Leader?
The question is: Forget about democracy, what kind of reform is possible within these constraints?
Some propose, as a solution, to nominate a candidate like Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq(2) A candidate who would stand up to the Leader and the organizations under his control. Firstly, there is no one among the nominated candidates who is, even slightly, like Dr. Mossadeq. The reformist groups constantly point out that we should limit the expectations; not much can be done [in these situations]. Secondly, a Mossadeq-like person will not be approved [as a candidate].
Others emphasize the point that, in countries where rose revolutions took place, people participated in the elections instead of boycotting it. But it must be noted that there, the election process was a fair one and was held under the watch of international community. The leader of the opposition was not eliminated. If the ruling system cheats in counting the votes, a velvet revolution backed by the international forces takes place. Moreover the struggle is over the main power in the country. But here [in Iran] the main power is in the hands of the Leader-for-life and he rules supreme. The appointed institutions will turn a liberal(3) President into a mere caretaker. There, the opposition candidate stands against the leader of the establishment and publicly exposes his tyranny and corruption. But here, all candidates must prove their practical commitment, belief in, and devotion to the Leader. Not only is the judiciary system not impartial and independent, but it follows every word of the Leader by the letter. When the reformists could not do anything for democracy, eventhough they took control of the cabinet and the sixth Majlis with the majority of people's votes, what can they do now with these candidates and a distrusting population? Let's suppose that the reformists win the presidential elections and in three years' time take control of the Majlis again. Then they must continue with the project of [establishing and consolidating] the civil society. Their first move must be changing the trades [and syndicates] law. But it will be rejected by the Council of Guardians. Didn't the Council of Guardians reject the independence of lawyers, which was in the fourth [five-year] plan, and didn't the seventh Majlis remove it altogether? The medical profession law needs the political system to approve the legitimacy of physician candidates [who are nominated for their syndicates]. Reforming the law in order to increase the power of trade syndicates and assemblies and non-governmental organizations will not appeal to the Leader and the Council of Guardians appointed by him. Any attempt to reform the law of the press was found by the Council of Guardians to be against the sharia [Islamic law] since the Leader was opposed to it. That which became of issues pertaining to the [state of the] jury [in Islamic courts], the definition of political crime, etc., is well known to all. They only recognize governmental assemblies.
Democracy is an evidence of the existence of a strong civil society that is based on various intermediary groups, from women assemblies and labour unions to cooperatives and trade councils. Such groups serve as probably the most effective tools in communicating social demands to decision-makers. They can also play an important role in explaining the meaning of democracy to the people they deal with. From the start, the theory of liberal democracy considered volunteer assemblies essentially as complementory to the official represenative political institutions such as political parties, legislating houses and elected executives. The freedom of citizens in organizing a civil society forms a foundation for the diversity of people's interests and opinions, and makes a multi-party democracy possible. A society of active, independent and organized citizens is a guarantee that the government will not exceed its boundaries, and will not infringe the powers and freedoms that individuals should be able to enjoy without any governmental intervention.
This is what the current establishment does not allow and what cannot be attained through legal means, unless true independent assemblies are formed through civil disobedience. That, in turn, is inconsistent with the reformists motto of legalism [ie. remaing within legal boundaries of the current system].
2-3. Transition to democracy: The path the reformists have taken does not lead to a democratic system. Transition from sultanism to democracy needs the "delegitimization" of the ruling system and "noncooperation" with the personal ruler. But reformists create domestic and international legitimacy for the tyrannical ruler by cooperating with him. The tyrannical system is weakened through "continuous noncooperation" and so the conditions for transition to democracy are set. Democratic forces and groups must consciously and deliberately spread and popularize the idea of noncooperation in the society. All [political and intellectual] elite must refrain from cooperating with the tyrannical system. There are thousands of different ways of noncooperation that could be effectively used in practice. "Human resources" are one of the important origins of political power. The number of individuals and groups that obey and cooperate with tyrannical rulers plays an important role in stabilizing the tyrannical system. If noncooperation is utilized by a vast proportion of people, the tyrannical system will be faced with essential difficulties. Taking back "support" and "protection" is the most important step in eliminating dictatorships.
Additionally, the regime's moral and political legitimacy must be questioned. Any system should receive obedience and cooperation only to the extent that it is legitimate (has a right to rule). The more legitimate a system is, the more reliable is the obedience (conforming to the laws and orders) and cooperation that it receives [from its subjects]. The rulers' right to rule and the citizens' duty to obey is one of the main issues of the legitimacy of political systems. Delegitimizing the tyrannical ruler must show itself in practice.
Gaining legitimacy affects the regime's official goals and principles, its way of policy-making and even its political structure. Lack of legitimacy forces tyrannical regimes to widely use relatively costly methods of commanding the government and the society. Undemocratic regimes use the two methods of ideology and democratic elections to gain legitimacy. Ideological legitimacy secures an indirect legitimization for the regime, based on the principles and goals guarded in the respective ideology. The domination of democracy in our age has caused legitimate governments to be those that are based on people's choice, the public will or other democratic foundations. Semi-competitive elections are the most infamous method, using which a dictatorship can claim electoral/democratic legitimacy. Democratically disguised dictatorships use, as a source of legitimacy, semi-democratic elections for government officials with very limited powers who are all approved by the regime. Rigged semi-democratic elections are the legitimacy shop window of tyrannical systems. Dictatorships that put on a democratic mask abuse governmental resources and protective opportunities to decrease the competition in elections. In fact, elections in these regimes are played with rigged dice. Lack of freedom, fairness and impartiality in their conduct and execution are the main characteristics of these elections.
The reformists' false idea that only through active participation in the government can one achieve anything has, in practice, only led them to function as mere shop windows for the system, both inside and outside of the country. Although the reformists' widespread cooperation in the past 8 years through participation in the executive and legislative powers did not achieve anything for democracy in Iran, it did create legitimacy for tyrants. Ayatollah Montazeri's conduct in the past years is the best example of noncooperation and delegitimizing tyranny. Ayatollah Sanei too is blacklisted due to his noncooperation with the regime (= The Jurisprudent Ruler).
Why was Mohammadreza Shajarian's(4) letter to the IRIB forbidding them to broadcast his voice and face considered important? Since it was an example of "noncooperation" and "delegitimization." Why was Ayatollah Taheri's resignation from his position as Isfahan's leading cleric [imam] of Friday prayers important? Because it was an important instance of "noncooperation" that lead to delegitimization. Farhad's(5) wife announcement that he never let his voice be broadcast on the IRIB is an instance of noncooperation.
It is not clear how the silence of Mousavi Ardebili, Mousavi Khoiniha, [Mir Hossein] Mousavi, Abdollah Nouri, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, Ataollah Mohajerani ... should be interpreted. If they are consciously and deliberately abstaining from cooperation, their actions are, in proportion to their credibility [in the society], delegitimizing the system.
Participating in the elections (as candidates and as voters) is the best way to cooperate with, and legitimize, the system. Whereas boycotting the elections is an important instance of noncooperation and deligitimization of tyranny. Boycotting the election is the first step in noncooperation. Boycotting governmental occupations and positions, governmental departments and institutions, not accepting (and not cooperating with) officials appointed by the government, refusing to dissolve independent organizations and institutions, ... are other methods of noncooperation that must be considered. There are also social and economical ways not to cooperate that must be realized.
Reformists do not help the democratic process by turning up the heat of the ninth presidential elections, the same way they didn't help it in the [previous] city council elections and the seventh Majlis elections. The only outcome of their actions will be the use the conservatives will make of it after the elections to legitimize themselves and the ruling system.
(1) [The Rule of Jurisprudence; the central thesis of Islamic Republic put forward by Ayatollah Khomeini and enacted by the Islamic Republic Constitution. In brief it requires that all governmental activity be supervised and sanctioned by a Mujtahed, a scholar of Islamic law (Sharia) and rules (Fiqh) who will do so as the Supreme Leader.] GO BACK
(2) [Mossadeq was the prime minister during the oil nationalization movement from 1950 to 1953 who resisted Shah's power to the point that he left the country. Mossadeq was toppled shortly after Shah's escape in a CIA-backed coup.] GO BACK
(3) [Again "liberal" is used in its broad sense here, meaning freedom-loving, not as the title of a specific political or focus group.] GO BACK
(4) [Iranian traditional singer and musician, praised as a master of Iranian traditional music.] GO BACK
(5) [Late Iranian singer and musician, famous and popular for his social and political songs. He was banned from public performance after the revolution till a few years before his death in 2003.] GO BACK
(2) [Mossadeq was the prime minister during the oil nationalization movement from 1950 to 1953 who resisted Shah's power to the point that he left the country. Mossadeq was toppled shortly after Shah's escape in a CIA-backed coup.] GO BACK
(3) [Again "liberal" is used in its broad sense here, meaning freedom-loving, not as the title of a specific political or focus group.] GO BACK
(4) [Iranian traditional singer and musician, praised as a master of Iranian traditional music.] GO BACK
(5) [Late Iranian singer and musician, famous and popular for his social and political songs. He was banned from public performance after the revolution till a few years before his death in 2003.] GO BACK
Preface >> Section 1 >> Section 3 >> Section 4 >> Section 5 >> Section 6 >> Section 7 >> Section 8 >> Section 9 >> Section 10
